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Este trabalho busca apresentar os desafios que os bancos centrais, ao adotarem metas 
para a inflação, estão sujeitos a enfrentar, considerando que as incertezas representam 
um elemento prejudicial para a eficácia da política monetária e que instabilidades 
financeiras são capazes de perturbar os mecanismos de transmissão – em particular, o 
canal das expectativas – e, assim, a estabilidade econômica. A estabilidade financeira 
não deve ser considerada como uma simples meta para a política monetária, mas uma 
precondição para os bancos centrais operarem suas políticas e, assim, alcançarem os 
objetivos de estabilidade da inflação e do produto. O trabalho identifica diferentes 
fontes de incertezas que circundam as decisões dos bancos centrais; e aborda o papel 
que os bancos centrais que adotam metas para a inflação deveriam desempenhar, de 
acordo com alguns princípios básicos que podem servir como guias úteis no sentido de 
ajudá-los a atingir resultados de sucesso na condução de sua política monetária. 
 
 






This work aims at presenting the challenges that inflation targeting central banks may 
face since uncertainties represent a harmful element for the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, and since financial instabilities may disturb the transmission mechanisms – in 
particular, the expectation channel – and thus the economic stability. Financial stability 
must not be considered as a simple goal of monetary policy, but a precondition for 
central banks operate their policies and reach the goals of inflation and output stability. 
The work identifies different sources of uncertainties that surround central banks’ 
decisions; and approaches the role that inflation targeting central banks should play 
according to some basic principles that can serve as useful guides for central banks to 
help them achieve successful outcomes in their conduct of monetary policy. 
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Challenges on Inflation Targeting 





Since the 1980s when central banks of the major industrial countries have been 
successful at bringing inflation down to low and stable levels, policymakers around the 
world have committed themselves more explicitly with the objective of keeping 
inflation under control. Nevertheless, while inflation stability has long been suggested 
as a primary objective for monetary policy, questions like how central banks should 
implement their policies have arisen, proposing practical obstacles. 
1 
 
Recently, a number of countries have adopted explicit inflation targets as a guide for 
monetary policies since a numerical target is attractive for anchoring inflation 
expectations, with favorable effects on financial markets and then on the economy. This 
strategy requires commitment, transparency, clear communication and accountability 
from central banks – which represent essential elements for reducing uncertainties. 
  
The work aims at presenting the challenges that inflation targeting central banks may 
face since uncertainties represent a harmful element for the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, and since financial instabilities may disturb the transmission mechanisms and 
then the economic stability (the works of Bean, 2003, 2004; Disyatat, 2005; Akram and 
Eitrheim, 2006; Akram, Bardsen and Lindquist, 2007 aims at presenting the relation 
between),. The work identifies different sources of uncertainties that surround central 
banks’ decisions; and approaches the role of inflation targeting central banks according 
to some “basic principles that can serve as useful guides for central banks to help them 
achieve successful outcomes in their conduct of monetary policy” (Mishkin, 2000, p. 1). 
It is suggested that the Flexible Inflation Forecast Targeting strategy follows these 
principles and represents a realistic strategy to reduce these uncertainties, to improve the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and to deal with possible financial and liquidity crises. 
 
Besides this introduction the paper presents four more sections: section two describes 
different sources of uncertainties that potentially affect monetary policy decisions; 
section three presents the inflation targeting framework as a strategy for central banks 
aiming at stabilizing the economy and reducing uncertainties; section four approaches 
some challenges inflation targeting central banks are supposed to face; section five 
presents the final considerations. 
                                                 
1 These practical obstacles were approached by both New Classical (old mainstream) and New 
Keynesians (new mainstream) theoreticians. For example, through the works of Kydland and Prescott, 
1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983a, 1983b; Rogoff, 1985; Barro, 1986; Lohmann, 1992; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1993; Taylor, 1993; Walsh, 1995; Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997; Blinder, 1998; Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler, 1999; Svensson, 1999a, 1999b; Mishkin, 2000; Woodford, 2007. New Keynesians are the 
theoreticians of Inflation Targeting – which is partly against the New Classical mainstream. The first 
articles of the note belong to the old mainstream:  the credibility literature of the New Classical 
economics. This literature is now dominated by a new mainstream coming from New Keynesian.  
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2. Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty is a characteristic of the real world that affects the decision-making process 
of all economic agents (including central banks’ decisions and the consequences of their 
policies). Both academics and policymakers agree that monetary policy is made in an 
environment of substantial uncertainty regarding current and future economic 
conditions as well as the functioning of the economy. In this sense, several researches 
have begun to analyze the implications of uncertainties for monetary policy (Brainard 
1967; Friedman, 1968; Poole, 1970; Batini, Martin and Salmon, 1999; Goodhart, 1999; 
Dequech, 1999a, 1999b; Issing, 1999; ECB, 2001; Dow, 2004). 
2 
 
In order to improve the effectiveness of monetary policies, central banks should know 
what types of uncertainties they face; otherwise their policy reactions based solely on 
the forecasts produced under the certainty assumption would be too costly for the 
economy. Hence, three general broad forms of uncertainties can be identified: (i) the 
state of the economy uncertainty, (ii) the model or parameter uncertainty and, (iii) the 
strategic uncertainty. 
 
2.1 State of the Economy Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainties regarding the prevailing state of the economy arise at two levels: 1) 
information about the data is imperfect – there are problems of availability and quality 
of the data, since some data present delays, different methodologies and errors; 2) the 
lack of data concerning some variables and the use of other economic indicators as 
proxies for these unobservable measures may lead to false conclusions about the state of 
the economy. 
 
Central banks often face the challenge of assessing accurately the prevailing economic 
conditions. Such an assessment supports monetary policy decisions that will be taken 
aiming at reaching predetermined goals. Concerning data and information uncertainty, 
Orphanides (2001) and Orphanides and Williams (2002) present important results on 
the literature on this kind of uncertainty. 
 
In order to interpret the current state of the economy and then taking the correct 
decisions, it is crucial that central banks analyze the available and observable data and 
indicators to better understand and identify the nature and persistence of shocks at the 
economy. It is important, for example, to identify whether the observed shocks originate 
from the demand or the supply side, whether they originate from domestic or foreign 
sources, and whether they are supposed to be transitory or long-lasting, because each of 
these will affect the economy in a different way requiring the appropriate monetary 
policy response. 
 
2.2 Model or Parameter Uncertainty 
 
There is no consensus among economists about the real or the best representative model 
of the economy. As pointed by Dow (2004, p. 539): “dissatisfaction with large models 
                                                 
2 While problems of risks are well covered by economic literature, it is, in fact, the problem of uncertainty 
that turns the lives of central bankers and other policymakers more difficult. For the difference between 
risk and uncertainty, see for example the definition presented by Knight (1921). 
  3has brought to the surface in policy-making circles the issue of how far economic 
models reflect the ‘true’ structure of the economy and the transmission of monetary 
policy, that is, their explanatory power”. 
 
The  model/parameter uncertainty problem can be understood as the uncertainty 
regarding the best model to use as a representation of the functioning of the economy in 
a specific context, which ends up generating an uncertainty about the precise economic 
policy to be implemented which aims at improving the performance of the economy. 
While several models have contributed with different ideas and deeper understanding of 
the economy, none has yet provided a fully satisfactory, unified and uncontroversial 
description of the economy and its transmissions processes as a whole. Therefore, there 
is a basic uncertainty about which models provide suitable descriptions of the structural 
relationships in the economy. 
 
Since each model per se constitutes a simplification of the economy which abstracts 
from relevant aspects of reality, policymakers will face the problem of deciding which 
model or sort of model is convenient to use. However, as pointed by Dow (2004, p. 
541), “the nature of the economic system is not such as to yield a single, deterministic 
model”. Actions of economic policy themselves require a range of models. 
 
Even if there were a consensus on a suitable model, considerable uncertainty would 
remain concerning the structural relationships within that particular model. 
Policymakers may be unsure about how changes in one variable will affect another 
variable, that is, may be unsure about the parameters in the transmission mechanism. 
This sort of uncertainty appears when policymakers do not know the values of the 
parameters that enter the model. Influential analyses regarding “parameter uncertainty” 
were provided by Brainard (1967) and Poole (1970). Both gave attention to 
uncertainties’ implications upon optimal monetary policy, considering the consequences 
of additive
3 and multiplicative uncertainties. The work of Söderström (2002) represents 
a recent contribution on the Brainard’s result. 
4 Recently, the literature on monetary 
policy and uncertainty performed wide evolution as perceived through the contributions 
of Giannoni (2002), Kimura and Kurozumi (2003), Svensson (2003b), Walsh (2004; 
2005), Onatski and Williams (2005) and, Dennis (2007). 
 
A successful monetary policy response cannot ignore the uncertainty about the 
parameters in the transmission of monetary policy, in other words, central banks must 
take into account not only shocks that affect the economy but also how monetary 
policies are transmitted to the economy, taken seriously multiplicative uncertainty. 
5 
Central banks cannot also ignore the uncertainty about the length of time it takes for one 
                                                 
3 The additive uncertainty problem represents the uncertainties about omitted variables or shocks that 
affect the economy.  
4 Söderström (2002) showed that – in contrast to the received wisdom presented by Brainard – uncertainty 
about the parameters in a dynamic macroeconomic model may lead to more aggressive monetary policy. 
In particular, when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation, it may be optimal for the central 
bank to respond to shocks more aggressively in order to reduce uncertainty about the future development 
of inflation 
5 The Uncertainty about the coefficient of a variable in the transmission mechanism is referred to as 
multiplicative uncertainty and can be intrinsic to the economy or due to econometric estimation. 
  4variable to affect another (called lag uncertainty), for instance, the time that a monetary 
policy action takes to affect inflation or output. 
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Another fundamental problem regarding “model/parameter uncertainty” relates to the 
critique of Lucas (1976): parameters may vary over time as a result of structural change 
in the economy, that is, “whatever the corrected model was before policy action, that 
action would itself change the structure of the economy, raising the possibility of 
uncertainty about the transmission mechanism” (Dow, 2004, p. 544). Thus, the 
transmission mechanism from monetary policy to prices or any other variable is highly 
uncertain because shocks come from many different sources – including monetary 
policy itself – and knowledge concerning the influence of lags is inaccurate. 
 
2.3 Strategic Uncertainty 
 
This sort of uncertainty arises from the interaction among different economic agents (for 
instance, from the interaction between central banks and private agents). Regarding the 
implementation of monetary policies and actual central banks interventions through 
inflation targeting, it relates to the role of transparency and communication and how 
these may affect the expectation transmission mechanism as well as the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. 
7 Central banks face some degree of uncertainty concerning the 
reaction of both economic agents and financial markets to their own policy decisions, as 
well as economic agents and financial markets may be unsure about central banks’ 
announcements, actions and motivations. 
 
Aiming at reducing this sort of uncertainty and then turning central banks’ tasks easier, 
both economic agents and central banks should act through stable, reliable and widely 
transparent patterns of behavior. The announcement of objectives and goals to be 
followed and a strategy to guide and explain policy choices are crucial elements to 
reduce strategic uncertainty and to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
 
The commitment to achieve the established goals must not be reneged by central banks 
if they want to enhance their own credibility and the credibility of their policies. Since 
monetary policy affects the economic performance through expectations, a key concern 
for almost all central banks has been the maintenance of a high level of credibility with 
respect to their ability to achieve their goals. 
8  
 
Other sort of uncertainty that has attracted recent attention is the uncertainty about the 
weights central banks put in their objectives, representing a mix of parameter 
uncertainty and strategic uncertainty. Hence, an important task of central banks is to 
reduce uncertainties on the markets by trying to influence them, through expectations, 
about their objectives, strategies and commitment. 
 
                                                 
6 “Lag uncertainty” introduces volatility in the effects of a variable; however its distinctive feature is that 
it shifts the effects of the variable between periods. 
7 For more details regarding the influence of central banks’ reputation, credibility and transparency upon 
agents’ expectations see Montes and Feijó (2007). 
8 Monetary policies affect the economy through different transmission channels, such as: 1) the interest 
rate channel, 2) the exchange rate channel, 3) the broad credit channel, 4) the asset prices channel and, 5) 
the expectations channel. The present article calls attention for the expectation channel since it represents 
an important transmission mechanism for inflation targeting central banks. For more details see, for 
example, Mishkin (1995), Berk (1998), de Mendonça (2001) and, Kuttner and Mosser (2002). 
  53. Implementing Monetary Policy under Uncertainty 
 
Since uncertainties surround almost all economic decisions and these economic 
decisions affect the performance of the economy, how should central banks deal with 
uncertainty in setting monetary policy? Woodford (2003, p. 14) establishes that “there is 
good reason for a central bank to commit itself to a systematic approach to policy that 
not only provides an explicit framework for decisionmaking within the bank, but that is 
also used to explain the bank’s decisions to the public”. The commitment to a policy 
strategy or to an objective or to both may facilitate public understanding about the 
policy implemented and hence improve the economic performance since it tends to 
reduce strategic uncertainty. As the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the 
public’s expectations about actual and future policy actions, commitment with clear 
objectives and tactical actions are able to shape public expectations. Thus, the ability of 
central banks to affect the actual and future economic performances through public 
decisions depends on their ability to influence private sector expectations regarding not 
only the future path of the interest rate and the future state of the economy but also the 
manner in which they implement actual and future policies, make their announcements 
and account to the public.
9 As argued by Sellon Jr. (2004, p. 32): “Financial markets are 
likely to be heavily guided by central banks statements about the state of the economy 
and the likely course of future policy in judging the degree of persistence of the current 
stance of policy”. 
10 
 
One of the most intriguing puzzles faced by policymakers and central banks is how 
should they deal with uncertainties concerning the nature and the length of a shock, and 
in which principles should they base their actions? 
 
Mishkin (2000) presented some basic principles that must serve as useful guides for 
central banks avoid the creation of uncertainties as well as conduct their policies and 
better reach their goals. 
11 These principles are: 1) price stability provides substantial 
benefits; 2) fiscal policy should be aligned with monetary policy; 3) time-inconsistency 
is a problem to be avoided; 4) monetary policy should be forward-looking; 5) 
accountability is a basic principle of democracy; 6) monetary policy should be 
concerned about output as well as price fluctuations, and; 7) the most serious economic 
downturns are associated with financial instability. Another relevant principle should be 
added to that list: in modern economies, expectations play a decisive role as a 
transmission mechanism of monetary policies. 
 
Besides these principles, Mishkin (2000, p. 3) also suggests some features that central 
banks should present, the role they should play and some criteria they should follow, 
such as: (i) price stability should be the overriding, long-run goal of monetary policy; 
(ii) an explicit nominal anchor should be adopted; (iii) a central bank should be goal 
dependent; (iv) a central bank should be instrument independent; (v) a central bank 
                                                 
9 Although the uncertainties previously mentioned have the potential of affecting the ability of central 
banks reaching their goals, such as low and stable inflation with low output variability, they do not limit 
the ability of central banks to avoid a high and rising level of inflation and/or a deep recession. 
Uncertainty is a relevant difficulty put forward by central banks managers for the definition and the 
transmission of the monetary policy; however it must not be an excuse for allowing an undesirable 
economic performance. 
10 For a deeper explanation regarding the expectations transmission channel as well as the influence of 
central banks’ policies upon agents’ expectations see Montes (2007). 
11 See also Goodfriend (2007). 
  6should be accountable; (vi) a central bank should stress transparency and 
communication, and; (vii) a central bank should also have the goal of financial stability. 
Moreover, a new communication strategy is emerging in terms of expectations 
management: interest rate expectations. This new strategy is an attempt of central banks 
to reduce uncertainty regarding the link between the short term and long term interest 
rates. It is thus related to the theory of the term structure, especially the expectations 
theory of the term structure. 
 
In practice, inflation targeting emerged and developed itself as a consistent framework 
according to the principles and features that a strategy might present and according to 
the role central banks should play. The inflation targeting framework has reduced 
uncertainty about the goals and instruments of monetary policy without precluding 
policy activism, and provided a strategy that allows for “the pursuit of objectives other 
than price stability in a more disciplined and consistent manner” (Bernanke et al., 1999, 
p. 21). The framework represents a strategy that follows all the principles and features 
mentioned above. Besides, it helps to reduce uncertainty about the future course of 
inflation and to influence and guide expectations since (i) it provides monetary policy 
with a nominal anchor, and (ii) the announcement of inflation targets communicates the 
central banks’ intentions to the public and to the financial markets. Modern central 
banks, in fact, when adopt the inflation targeting strategy, establish that “the objective is 
not to affect the real conditions of the economy but rather to directly influence the 
expectations of private agents, which are judged self-fulfilling” (Le heron, 2003, p. 21). 
 
3.1 Inflation Targeting 
 
After initial adoption by New Zealand in 1990, a number of countries
12 have opted for 
this strategy or some variant in order to establish an institutional commitment to price 
stability as the primary long-run goal of monetary policy. Inflation targeting is a 
framework characterized by the public announcement of an official quantitative 
inflation target (or target ranges) which presents wide and explicit acknowledgement 
that price stability – meaning low and stable inflation – represents central banks’ 
primary long-term goal. An explicit numerical target for inflation is published, either as 
a point or a range, and a time horizon for reaching the inflation target – and in which the 
target will be valid – is defined. This strategic framework seeks to improve 
communication between private agents and policymakers, and to provide discipline, 
credibility, accountability, transparency and flexibility in central banks’ actions. 
13 In 
this sense, the framework may help reducing strategic uncertainty since improves 
communication, transparency and the way central banks are going to act.  
 
The framework makes clear that even if monetary policy presents an explicit focus on 
inflation it still can also be flexible, that is, it does not intend to tie central banks’ hands 
through a  mechanical rule that considers only one type of functioning model for the 
economy – which does not deal with unusual and unforeseen circumstances. 
 
                                                 
12 Such as Canada, England, Sweden, Australia, Chile, Brazil, Israel, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the 
Philippines and Thailand. 
13 Since monetary policy affects the economy through expectations, it must be emphasized “that the 
words Transparency, Communication and Credibility, arise from the central banks’ willingness to 
‘manipulate’ the expectations of the private sector” (Le Heron, 2003, p. 21). 
  7The inflation targeting framework does not consider a specific functioning model for the 
economy, actually, as Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 22) presented, 
 
inflation targeting requires the central bank to use structural and 
judgmental models of the economy, in conjunction with whatever 
information it deems relevant, to pursue its price-stability 
objective. In other words, inflation targeting is very much a ‘look 
at everything’ strategy, albeit one with a focused goal. 
 
Therefore, the framework, in fact, aims at providing a discipline-enhancing nominal 
anchor for monetary policy. Inflation targeting is not a framework that will directly 
solve the model uncertainty problem. One could say that solving the model uncertainty 
problem is a matter of choosing the right (or the best) model to represent the functioning 
of the economy, however, since (i) there is a lot of disagreement about which model 
better represent the functioning of the economy, and (ii) the structure of the economy 
may change over time, that central banks should not blindly follow only one sort of 
model. Hence, in the real world this choice does not really matter, as Blinder (1998, p. 
7) revealed: “no central bank that I know of, and certainly not the Federal Reserve, is 
wed to a single econometric model of its economy”.
14 So, model uncertainty does not 
represent the sort of uncertainty that the inflation targeting framework attempts to 
directly eliminate, actually the framework concerns much more on strategic uncertainty 
and its implications over the process of expectations formation and decision-making. 
 
Since monetary policies affect the economy through expectations of the public, most 
inflation targeting central banks have found that transparency, accountability and 
effective communication policies are a useful way of making financial markets and the 
private sector partners in the policymaking process. When central banks communicate 
clearly their strategies in order to explain their goals as well as how they plan to reach 
them, promoting a better public understanding, strategic uncertainty is reduced. 
15 
 
Macroeconomic theory is moving toward a “new consensus” regarding the role of 
monetary policy and how central banks should act 
16 considering a world surrounded by 
uncertainties. Since the contributions of Friedman (1968), Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
and Barro and Gordon (1983a), central banks attempt to act through rule-based policies 
in order to avoid the problems of time inconsistency and loss of credibility as well as to 
reduce uncertainties. However, as suggested by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Bernanke 
(2003), in practice, inflation targeting does not represent a blindly mechanical rule-
                                                 
14 As an influential central banker, Blinder (1998, p. 12) presented the following statement concerning 
uncertainties and the selection of models through a practical guideline: “My approach to this problem 
while on the Federal Reserve Board was relatively simple: Use a wide variety of models and don’t trust 
any of them too much. So, for example, when the Federal Reserve staff explored policy alternatives, I 
always insisted on seeing results from (a) our own quarterly econometric model, (b) several alternative 
econometric models, and (c) a variety of vector autoregressions (VARs) that I developed for this 
purpose”.   
15 Mishkin (2000, p. 7) presents other benefits for transparency, communication and accountability: 
“Increasing transparency and accountability not only helps to align central banks with democratic 
principles, and is thus worthy of its own right, but it also has benefits for the ability of central banks to 
conduct monetary policy successfully”. 
16 This recent literature on macroeconomics, uncertainty, inflation targeting and financial stability is 
rapidly evolving, adding crucial elements on the models, such as: robust control, targeting rule and 
expectations management. See, for example: Goodfriend and King (1997), Svensson, (2003), Woodford 
(2003), and Goodfriend (2007). 
  8based strategy; it may be labeled as a policy framework of “constrained discretion” and 
a communication strategy which aims at focusing on expectations and explaining policy 
strategies to the public in order to anchor inflation expectations and then promote price 
stability together with output and employment stability. 
 
As inflation targeting is in the world for almost two decades, it offers lessons on (i) the 
design and implementation of inflation targeting regimes, (ii) country performance 
under this strategy and (iii) the conduct of monetary policy (see, for example, the 
analyzes made by Bernanke et al. 1999). After all these years of experience, one could 
state that full-fledged inflation targeting is based on the following pillars: 1) an 
institutional commitment to price stability, 2) absence of other nominal anchors, 3) 
policy instrument independence, 4) policy transparency and accountability, 5) absence 
of fiscal dominance and 6) a forward-looking monetary policy strategy. 
17 
 
Moreover, the framework enforces central banks to develop and to strength their 
credibility and reputation in order to better affect the expectations of the public. It is 
suggested that credible inflation targets strengthen forward-looking expectations on 
inflation and thus weaken the weight of past inflation; reinforcing and legitimating the 
self-fulfilling feature belonged to expectations. Policy signals from credible monetary 
authorities – with strong and well defined reputations – will be better understood and 
generally accepted by market participants and the public, resulting in a more effective 
monetary transmission mechanism (through expectations) and a lower cost of 
disinflation whenever a policy of this sort might be implemented. As credibility and 
reputation are built along the time, inflation targeting will not reduce inflation 
expectations quickly, but rather it will do so gradually over time. This gradualism is 




In practice, inflation targeting is better described as Flexible Inflation Forecast 
Targeting. 
19 This kind of strategy is characterized by a more gradualist policy where 
central banks carefully manipulate their instruments, lengthen their horizons and aim at 
reaching the inflation target further in the future. The gradualism adopted and/or the 
flexibility implicit may be explained by central banks’ concerns about output stability, 
exchange rate volatility, interest rate smoothing and model/parameter uncertainties. 
 
Hence, the Flexible Inflation Forecast Targeting strategy establishes that both output 
fluctuations and price stability represent important central banks’ objectives. It is 
important and pertinent to clarify that (i) inflation targeting does not involve a 
mechanical rule-based policymaking, it means that inflation targeting does not represent 
                                                 
17 However, many countries –such as Chile, Israel, England, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Korea and South 
Africa – adopted inflation targeting without satisfying one or more of the above conditions.  
18 Under this framework, central banks are only concerned with achieving the inflation target. Therefore, 
if inflation and inflation expectations have deviated from the target, central banks attempt to bring 
inflation back to the target as quickly as possible. This kind of attitude may require aggressive instrument 
movements which may lead to output and/or real exchange rates volatility. 
19 The term “Forecast” is due to the fact that monetary policy influences inflation with a lag, hence, 
keeping inflation under control may require the central bank to anticipate future movements in inflation. 
In this sense, constrained discretion is an inherently forward-looking policy approach. As Svensson  
(1999, p. 14) stressed: “current monetary policy actions can only affect the future levels of inflation and 
the output gap, in practice with substantial lags and with the total effects spread out over several quarters. 
This makes forecasts of the target variables crucial in monetary policy”.  
  9a strict rule, but a policy framework, and (ii) since the public cares about inflation as 
well as output and employment stabilization, the flexible strategy does not focus 
exclusively on inflation and ignores other objectives, such as output, employment, 
financial stability and exchange rate volatility. 
 
Flexible Inflation Forecast Targeting may be understood as a framework which 
combines commitment and flexibility, that is, a scheme of constrained discretion. In the 
words of Bernanke (2003): 
 
Under constrained discretion, the central bank is free to do its best 
to stabilize output and employment in the face of short-run 
disturbances, with the appropriate caution born of our imperfect 
knowledge of the economy and of the effects of policy (this is the 
"discretion" part of constrained discretion). However, a crucial 
proviso is that, in conducting stabilization policy, the central bank 
must also maintain a strong commitment to keeping inflation – and, 
hence, public expectations of inflation – firmly under control (the 
‘constrained’ part of constrained discretion). 
 
Interpreting inflation targeting as a type of monetary policy rule
20 is a 
mischaracterization of this approach as it is actually practiced by contemporary central 
banks. Under Flexible Inflation Forecast Targeting central banks do not follow simple 
and mechanical operational instructions. Rather, the approach provides central banks to 
use their structural and judgmental models of the economy with all relevant 
information, to determine the best policy action to achieve the inflation target and to 
reduce the output gap volatility. If new significant information has arrived, the forecasts 
and the instrument path are updated. As Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 6) stressed: “By 
imposing a conceptual structure and its inherent discipline on the central bank, but 
without eliminating all flexibility, inflation targeting combines some of the advantages 
traditionally ascribed to rules with those ascribed to discretion”. 
 
In order to reduce strategic uncertainty and better influence financial markets and 
public’s expectations, policymakers make use of nominal anchors. One of the strongest 
arguments for the adoption of inflation targeting is that it can help to provide monetary 
policy with a nominal anchor. Since monetary policy is most effective in the presence of 
a nominal anchor – and the more understandable that anchor is to the public the better – 
and acknowledging that all monetary policy regimes are in fact discretionary – being 
discretion a matter of degree – that inflation targeting represents a strategic option 
according to modern principles on monetary policy. 
 
Although central banks ought to direct their attentions to the inflation process and how 
inflation expectations are evolving in order to keep inflation low and stable and to 
reduce the uncertainties resulted from these aspects, they cannot forget that their 
policies may both assuage (or even save) as well as unchain financial crises. It is 
observed that financial crises and their subsequent liquidity banking crises have become 
                                                 
20 Following Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 5): “Rules are monetary policies that are essentially automatic 
requiring little or nothing in the way of macroeconomic analysis or value judgments by the monetary 
authorities”; and complement saying that “critics, however, have argued that any discipline created by 
rules comes at a high cost, since a rule rigorously followed deprives the central bank of its ability to deal 
with unusual or unforeseen circumstances, let alone with fundamental changes in the economy”. 
  10world-wide phenomena in recent years. Not only have financial and liquidity banking 
crises occurred in developed countries such as the United States (which presented the 
dotcom bubble and the recent subprime mortgage crisis
21), Japan, and some European 
countries, but they have been a feature of the recent economic scene in developing 
countries as well – like Mexico, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Russia, 
Brazil and Argentina. 
 
Hence, an important puzzle that must be solved concerning inflation targeting – which 
represents a challenge for policymakers – is how central banks should act in order to 
avoid or assuage financial and liquidity banking crises, since these crises can shift 
dramatically economic growth, inflation and inflation expectations paths. Besides, 
another matter of great concern is how monetary policy should be implemented in order 
to become more flexible, nevertheless without compromising the goal of price stability.  
 
4. Challenges on Inflation Targeting 
 
Central banks that opted for adopting inflation targeting not necessarily did it the same 
way. 
22 Hence, some challenges that central banks usually face when inflation targeting 
is adopted will be briefly presented and attention will be given for the role that inflation 
targeting central banks should play in such a way that the goal (or the precondition) of 
financial stability is achieved. 
 
4.1 Designing and Implementing Inflation Targeting: Operational Issues 
 
The way policymakers design and implement the inflation targeting strategy has an 
important meaning and a strong effect on how well transparency, accountability, 
communication and flexibility affect the monetary policy effectiveness. Since inflation 
targeting is a framework for “constrained discretion”, the definition of some operational 
issues will not tend to the design of a framework which is similar to a mechanical rule. 
Among the operational issues that arise in the implementation of inflation targeting, 
policymakers shall discuss and emphasize the following matters: 
 
                                                 
21 The subprime mortgage crisis was a sharp rise in home foreclosures which started in the U.S. during 
the year of 2006 and became a global financial crisis during 2007 and 2008. The crisis began with the 
bursting of the housing bubble in the U. S. and high default rates on “subprime”, adjustable rate, “Alt-A”, 
and other mortgage loans made to higher-risk borrowers with lower income or less credit history than 
“prime” borrowers. Some economists argue that government policy actually encouraged the development 
of the subprime debacle through legislation like the Community Reinvestment Act, which they say forces 
banks to lend to otherwise uncreditworthy consumers. Besides, credit rating agencies were put under 
scrutiny for giving investment-grade ratings to securitization transactions based on subprime mortgage 
loans. Higher ratings were justified by various credit enhancements including overcollateralization, credit 
default insurance, and equity investors willing to bear the first losses. Critics argue that conflicts of 
interest were involved, as rating agencies are paid by the firms that organize and sell the debt to investors, 
such as investment banks. The FED and other central banks around the world, has taken several steps to 
address the crisis. The FED’s response has basically followed two tracks: (i) efforts to support market 
liquidity and functioning (through open market operations and lowers interest rates charged to member 
banks)  and, (ii) the pursuit of macroeconomic objectives through monetary policy.  
22 As Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002, p. 175) mentioned: “inflation targeters vary widely with regard 
to implementation features, including the target price index, target width, target horizon, escape clauses, 
accountability of target misses, goal independence, and overall transparency and accountability of the 
conduct of policy”. 
  11(i)  The definition of the target as well as the choice of the numerical values for 
the targets. It must be decided which measure of inflation will be used – that 
is, the price index whose rate of change is to be targeted – and what 
numerical value the target point and/or the target range should have. 
23 
Defining the price index as well as the target point and the target range 
represent strategic choices which will bring impact over monetary policy 
conduction in terms of being stricter or more flexible 
24; 
 
(ii)  The time horizon over which the target is relevant. The definition of the time 
horizon will bring implications to the magnitudes in which the monetary 
policy instrument (interest rate) will be manipulated. This subject must be 
very well analyzed before decided since monetary policy affects the 
economy with long lags. 
25 One of the best ways to deal with the problems 
of controllability and instrument instability is by lengthening the target 
horizon to correspond more closely to the lags in the effect of monetary 
policy on inflation. Too short horizons (less than one year) must be avoided 
since targets can be missed and thus credibility reduced; too long horizons 
should also be avoided since they can represent a low commitment with the 
price stability goa
26 l  ; 
                                                
 
(iii)  The conditions under which the target (or the framework) should be 
modified. This subject is very polemical and controversial since changing the 
target means changing the tolerance to inflation. Sometimes the target point 
or the target range must be adjusted – upward or downward – for many and 
different reasons. 
27 Changes in the target may not be perceived by the 
public as an artifice used by policymakers to justify their errors or 
incompetence. Rather, “so long as variations in the target path are announced 
far enough in advance that they do not appear to be merely an ex post 
rationalization of actual inflation outcomes, changes in the target path are 
generally perceived by the public to be a reasonable way of adapting to 
economic conditions. (…) with adequate explanation from the central bank, 
 
23 Regarding the relation among transparency, accountability and data legitimacy, the data should be 
compiled by an agency that is independent of the monetary authority in order to assure the public that the 
central bank is not manipulating the data; data should not be compiled by monetary authorities. 
24 When central banks announce a narrow target range they aim at communicating greater commitment 
with the inflation goal than does a broader range; however, a narrower range reduces central banks’ 
ability to react to unexpected (or unforeseen) events and rises the likelihood of breaching the target range. 
As a consequence, the breach of the inflation target range may result in a strong loss of credibility for the 
central bank. Moreover, missing an entire range may be perceived by the public as a more serious failure 
of policy than missing a target point. Hence, the establishment of a target range have to guarantee both 
flexibility to the monetary policy and commitment to the price stability goal, as well as conveys to the 
public the message that control of inflation is imperfect. 
25 Countries aiming at reducing high inflation through the adoption of inflation targeting should not 
combine too short a horizon with both a very low target point and a narrow target range because this 
strategy can lead to instrument instability problem, creating more uncertainties in the economy. Since 
wide excessive swings in the monetary instrument occur when central banks try to hit the inflation target, 
more uncertainties are created in the economy. Thus, the time horizon (over which the central bank is 
expected to achieve its inflation target) cannot be shorter than the control horizon (over which the policy 
is expected to affect the target variable) and cannot be too long since it may confuse the public about the 
central bank’s intentions and may represent a loss of commitment.   
26 Regarding the definition and/or the modification of the time horizon, these choices might be associated 
with the context of the economy as well as with the environment of financial stability. 
27 For example, supply shocks, financial crises, disinflation procedures and political instability. 
  12the public seems able to distinguish a one-time, temporary shock to inflation 
(…) from a change in trend inflation” (Bernanke et al., 1999, p. 292-93). 
                                                
 
(iv)  How to go about hitting the target as well as how to handle unintentional 
target misses. Inflation targeting central banks make use of all useful 
information available to the forecasting of inflation and then to set their main 
instrument (the interest rate) at each date so that the forecast of inflation and 
the observed inflation equal their target levels. Although inflation targeting 
was criticized as being non-operational since it does not emphasize and 
make use of directly observed intermediate targets (such as the money 
stock), the regime do use an intermediate target. This intermediate target is 
an inferred quantity – the current forecast of inflation at the target horizon. 
Inflation targeting central banks are often attempting to influence inflation 
expectations – through interest rates manipulations – since “self-fulfilling 
prophecies” represent a phenomenon that must not be neglected; besides, 
they are often concerned on establishing credibility for their tactics and 
policies in order to better influence inflation expectations and improve 
monetary policy effectiveness. Regarding target misses, sometimes they are 
accidental, but other times they are the result of bad policies. 
28  
 
It is unequivocal that when transparency, communication and accountability concerning 
all these issues are high, strategic uncertainty leans to become lower. Nevertheless, 
some important subjects regarding the interactions among financial stability, strategic 
uncertainty and the role of inflation targeting central banks facing financial crises are 
still opened for being better explored under the inflation targeting approach and, in fact, 
to be developed in order to improve monetary policy effectiveness. 
 
4.2 Financial Instability and the Role of Central Banks 
  
In practice, although inflation targeting central banks are primarily concerned with 
managing the rate of inflation, they do also attempt to avoid recessions (or output 
fluctuations) as well as financial instability crises. When a financial crisis happens, 
bringing liquidity banking crisis, central banks are often called to act as lenders of last 
resort to ensure liquidity to the system. Hence, a narrow focus on inflation might not 
impede central banks from paying appropriate attention to financial system stability. 
 
Financial stability might not be considered a secondary goal for central banks. 
Economic downturns and undesirable fluctuations are usually associated with financial 
instability which, in last instance, is also responsible for creating uncertainties and then 
for disturbing the decision-making process of both private agents and central banks. 
Thus, both financial stability and a healthy and well-developed financial system are 
necessary preconditions for monetary policies succeed under inflation targeting. Both 
preconditions represent a tremendous advantage in the execution of any monetary 
policy. For instance, if the financial and the banking systems are fragile or unsound, 
 
28 Hence, it is important to establish 1) when it is legitimate to miss a target (formal escape clauses), 2) 
whether the central banker will be punished for missing the target and the punishment he/she will suffer, 
and 3) whether the targets (point and/or range) should be re-set prior to the end of the announced time 
horizon and/or whether the time horizon should be re-set. Central banks must be able to explain that 
sometimes the misses are a result of unexpected events which are out of their control. 
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financial institutions have to turn frequently and on a large scale to 
the central bank for liquidity injections, and the institutions are 
likely to be so weak that their borrowers and their balance sheets 
cannot withstand the increases in interest rates that would be 
associated with the central bank mopping up in the market the 
liquidity that has been provided at the discount window…in such 
circumstances, the central bank will find it difficult to achieve its 
inflation objective, and its credibility will be undermined (Truman, 
2003, p. 52). 
 
The ideal situation would be central banks responding to dangerous asset price 
movements in order to stop bubbles from getting too far out of hand. However, it is not 
a simple task knowing whether a bubble is actually in progress. In fact, it is very 
difficult to identify whether a financial crisis is about to happen, representing an 
uncertainty concerning the real state of the economy. Though, if central banks are going 
to act in advance, they must be prudent when manipulating their policy instruments in 
order to avoid the strengthening of the uncertainties and the increase of output, inflation 
and inflation expectations volatility. 
 
Central banks have generally chosen to react after such bubbles burst to minimize 
collateral impacts on the economy, rather than trying to avoid the bubble itself. 
However, since changes in asset prices have important effects on economic forecasts 
and then on inflation and output, these economic forecasts are crucial to central banks 
decisions, because together with asset price and influenced by asset price movements 
they represent important transmission mechanisms for monetary policy. 
29 Hence, even 
under inflation targeting, central banks cannot neglect the appearance of bubbles and the 
possibility of financial crises occur; they must be constantly alert, monitoring and 
supervising financial markets attempting to avoid the burst of these bubbles and the 
occurrence of such crises and/or minimizing their impacts when already occurred. 
30 
 
The Flexible Inflation Forecast Targeting strategy provides a framework for conducting 
monetary policy in normal and stable contexts as well as for preventing the effects of 
financial crises. The framework induces central banks to automatically adjust interest 
rates in a stabilizing direction when asset price instability or other financial instabilities 
occur. The logic is straightforward; since asset price increases stimulate aggregate 
demand and asset price declines reduce it, inflation targeting central banks in order to 
stabilize aggregate demand will act raising interest rates as asset prices rise and 
reducing them when they fall. 
31 
                                                 
29 Regarding the effects of asset price movements on the economy through the “balance sheet channel”, 
see Bernanke and Gertler (2000). 
30 Bernanke and Gertler (2000) suggest that, under inflation targeting, central banks should not respond to 
changes in asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected inflation. For more details 
regarding the relation between inflation targeting and asset prices, inflation targeting and financial 
stability, or financial stability, see Goodhart (2001), Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadwhani (2002), Dillen 
and Sellin (2003), Levieuge (2002), Bean (2003; 2004), Disyatat (2005), Akram and Eitrheim (2006), 
Akram, Bärdsen and Linquist (2007), Cecchetti (2007). 
31 However, this type of solution to asset prices disturbances or financial fragility in the real world does 
not seem so automatic. If we take the example of the Fed with the subprimes crises, the solution is not 
simply to reduce interest rates. Indeed, it is clear that this strategy is an insurance policy that does not care 
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Severe episodes of financial instability are often related to asset price crashes, making 
monetary policy less effective in bringing the economy back to health. Since it is 
difficult to know whether a bubble is in progress, becoming its bursting an inevitable 
event, the problem fall on the policies that will follow the bursting. Some important 
lessons can be learned from the U.S (dotcom and “subprime” crises) and Japan (debt-
deflation crisis with banking and financial crisis) experiences and must be incorporated 
within the inflation targeting framework in order to avoid the creation of uncertainties 
and to guarantee the monetary policy effectiveness whenever financial crises occur: (i) 
central banks do not make a serious mistake in failing to stop a bubble, but rather in not 
responding fast enough after a bubble bursts, (ii) if a bubble bursting harms the balance 
sheets of the financial sector, central banks need to take immediate steps to restore the 
health of the financial system. Hence, central banks must be ready to react as fast as 
possible to an asset collapse if it occurs. 
 
Attempting to avoid the emergence of possible bubbles and aiming at establishing a 
“ready to react quickly” strategy to soften negative impacts of financial crises, inflation 
targeting central banks can issue “Financial Stability Reports”
32 and conduct 
simulations
33 in order to establish how they should respond to a financial collapse. Both 
measures do not hurt inflation targeting premises; actually, they improve commitment 
with the goals of financial and price stability as well as ameliorate communication, 
transparency and accountability. 
 
When crises or unexpected shocks happen, the monetary policy effectiveness may be 
affected and inflation targets may be missed. When it occurs, it does not mean that the 
entire inflation targeting strategy should be abandoned. Since Flexible Inflation 
Forecast Targeting is a strategy of “constrained discretion”, concerned about 
macroeconomic performance as a whole, sometimes it is accountable reconsidering 
and/or changing some operational elements of the framework. These possible 
reconsiderations and changes cannot reflect loss of commitment, transparency and 
accountability; rather they ought to represent advances on the framework that will 
improve monetary policy effectiveness without creating uncertainties. 
 
Countries living with frequent macroeconomic shocks may conclude that deviations 
from an inflation target are sometimes unavoidable. When such shocks happen, it may 
be expected that inflation will remain away from target for a relatively prolonged 
period, especially in the presence of an unhealthy banking sector. Even though 
temporary target misses are unavoidable and need not be harmful, very frequent and 
large misses can clearly undermine the credibility of central banks and their monetary 
                                                                                                                                               
at all about the inflation rate: it could jump and the Fed would continue to decrease its rate. It suggests 
that financial stability becomes a more important objective than the inflation target. 
32 As argued by Mishkin (2007, p. 531): “In these reports, the central bank can evaluate whether rises in 
asset prices might be leading to excessive risk-taking on the part of financial institutions. If this is what 
appears to be happening, the central bank can put pressure on the prudential regulators and supervisors of 
these institutions to rein in excessive risk-taking by financial institutions”. 
33 Mishkin (2007) establishes an analogy to describe the importance of such simulations: “The strategy of 
conducting simulations is similar to the training exercise and war games that militaries conduct to prepare 
their troops for combat. They train them to respond to different scenarios so they can react quickly and 
with confidence. (…) By conducting similar exercises, the central bank can minimize the negative 
impacts of a collapse of an asset price bubble without having to predict that a bubble is taking place or 
that it will burst in the near future” (Mishkin, 2007, p. 531). 
  15policies. Thus, for countries that adopted the inflation targeting framework and are often 
susceptible to shocks, financial fluctuations (for example, through asset price bubbles 
and exchange rates volatility) and adverse economic performances as a whole, the 
monetary authority will be challenged to make difficult judgments in the context of their 
inflation targeting framework in order to adjust the strategy. Hence the following 
aspects may be revisited: 
 
(i) The measure of inflation that is going to be used: whether keeping the adoption of 
the headline CPI or changing for a measure that excludes certain volatile components in 
order to focus on core inflation represents an important decision that policymakers have 
to take. Since some inflation shocks cannot be directly treated through monetary 
policies – in particular, through interest rate manipulations – and since central banks 
actually also aim at reducing the output gap volatility, central banks should adopt a 
strategy of reacting only against deviations of the price index which excludes such 
shocks. Hence, in order to avoid the instrument instability problem, which is strongly 
responsible for creating uncertainties in the economy, and thus the output gap volatility 
problem, central banks can target core inflation rather than headline CPI inflation. 
34 
When a strategy of core inflation is adopted, the items that are going to be excluded 
from the construction of the inflation measure must be decided, informed and explained 
ex ante; if the definition of the measure is well-explained by the authorities, 
transparency will not necessarily be lost, uncertainties will not be created and monetary 
policy will acquire the possibility of acting more flexible in some cases. Such strategy 
must not be interpreted as loss of commitment with the price stability goal, but the 
recognition that central banks cannot control all kinds of inflation pressures. 
35 
 
(ii) Use of escape clauses, the numerical values of the target point/range and of the 
time horizon: although a numerical target have to be determined, informed and must be 
in accordance with the established concept of “price stability” 
36 – meaning low and 
stable inflation – the concerns now are 1) when deviations from the target should be 
allowed and 2) whether the decision about changing the target point or the target range 
and/or the time horizon represent valid options. Hence, the incorporation of escape 
clauses represents an alternative that allows for misses of the inflation target without 
harming central banks’ credibility. Escape clauses might be elaborated to deal with 
                                                 
34 As Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 27) presented, “For maximum flexibility, the index should exclude price 
changes in narrowly defined sectors and one-time price jumps that are unlikely to affect trend or ‘core’ 
inflation”. 
35 Actually, through tight monetary policies, central banks are able to reduce the inflation rate as a whole; 
however, this result may be followed by the damage of sectors that have nothing to do with the inflation 
problem. 
36 As Mishkin (2000, p. 4) suggested: “Typical definitions of price stability have many elements in 
common with the commonly used legal definition of pornography in the United States – you know it 
when you see it. Thus, constraints on fiscal policy and discretionary monetary policy to avoid inflation 
might end up being quite weak because not everyone will agree on what price stability means in practice, 
providing both monetary policymakers and politicians a loophole to avoid making tough decisions to 
keep inflation under control. A solution to this problem, which supports the first three guiding principles, 
is to adopt an explicit nominal anchor that ties down exactly what the commitment to price stability 
means”. Greenspan (1996) suggests that, “price stability obtains when economic agents no longer take 
account of the prospective change in the general price level in their economic decisionmaking”. Blinder 
(1995) presents similar definition: “The definition I’ve long used for price stability is a situation where 
ordinary people in their ordinary course of business are not thinking and worrying about inflation”. 
Meltzer (1997) defines a situation of price stability as follows: “an inflation rate so close to zero that it 
ceases to be a significant factor in long-term planning”. 
  16target misses from exogenous shocks and events that are out of central banks direct 
control. These escape clauses must be clearly established and communicated ex ante 
through public communication. It means that, when the framework is about to be 
implemented as well as before the occurrence of any unexpected or adverse event, 
which lead to misses of the target, these escape clauses must be known by the public. 
37 
Regarding the possibility of changing the target point or the target range and/or the time 
horizon, these represent valid options when target misses become frequent and are 
followed by controllability and instrument volatility problems, and when output 
volatility as well as inflation expectations volatility increase, which create and strength 
strategic, state of the economy and model/parameter uncertainties. 
 
Changes on the operational design of the framework must follow the principles of 
transparency, communication and accountability as well as all the other principles that 
serve as guides for central banks conduct their policies, in order to avoid strategic 
uncertainties or any other uncertainty that may emerge. 
 
Besides, aiming at dealing with inflation pressures – which arise from both supply and 
demand shocks – through monetary policy, central banks must consider financial 
stability as a necessary condition. Without financial stability, central banks will not be 
able to implement their policies since they operate through financial market. Hence, 
financial stability must not be considered as a simple goal of monetary policy, but a 
precondition for central banks operate their policies and reach the goals of inflation and 
output stability. 
 
5. Final Considerations 
 
The paper attempted to approach and to suggest how inflation targeting central banks 
should conduct their interventions considering (i) some principles that serve as useful 
guides for their actions, (ii) the possibility of economic downturns associated with 
financial instability and, (iii) different types of uncertainties that exist and may affect 
the effectiveness of their policies. 
 
It was suggested that the Flexible Inflation Forecast Targeting framework represents a 
strategy that is able to deal with strategic uncertainty, since through transparency, 
accountability and communication the strategy clears that monetary policy is concerned 
about both output and price fluctuations. However, whether central banks will succeed 
and monetary policy will be effective, it will primordially depend on the operational 
design of the framework and on how healthy financial and monetary systems are. 
 
Hence, financial stability might not be considered as a simple “goal” for central banks, 
but a precondition for monetary policy succeeds in reaching their goals, because 
financial instability creates uncertainties, damages the transmission mechanisms and 
harms the effectiveness of monetary policies. Thus, central banks should consider 
financial stability and price stability as highly complementary objectives to be pursued 
since price instability as well as booms and busts in asset markets have important 
effects on the real economy. 
 
                                                 
37 Hence, deviations from the target will be allowed when these are clearly specified and previously 
communicated to the public through escape clauses. 
  17In this sense, the choice of implementing inflation targeting as a strategy aiming at 
reducing uncertainties and driving monetary policy decisions towards the quest for 
macroeconomic stability – since it acts as a nominal anchor for the process of inflation 
expectations formation and also allows degrees of discretion for the conduction of 
monetary policy – will be a correct option only if some preconditions were considered. 
For countries presenting high inflation rates or following crises (such as institutional, 
financial and/or political) the environment is too chaotic and the uncertainties 
concerning the real state of the economy are also too high which make the definition of 
the targets a difficult task and harms the implementation of monetary policy under 
inflation targeting. Besides, before choosing for inflation targeting as a strategy to be 
followed, certain institutional preconditions must be satisfied since the lack of adequate 
skills (such as independence goal, transparency, accountability and others) may 
jeopardize the success of the strategy, that is, institutions must present the capacity to 
implement inflation targeting and the authorities cannot lack the credibility needed – 
though credibility as well as reputation are conquered along the time. 
 
The financial stability requirement represents an institutional and a technical 
precondition to make inflation targeting feasible, useful and successful. Thus, once a 
country has adopted inflation targeting, financial, political and macroeconomic 
stabilities must be kept, even so operational changes become necessary. According to 
the economic context or the political environment, sometimes operational and 
institutional improvements will be demanded. Therein, the transparency, 
communication and accountability elements of the framework can assist in this process 
since the central bank’s credibility shall not be lost, the commitment with the price 
stability and output fluctuations goals shall be preserved and the creation of 
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